PHIL 139B: Topics in Logic: ConditionalsInstructor: Casey Rufener Prerequisites: PHIL 1a or PHIL 66b or one course numbered PHIL 35a through PHIL 38b. Course Description: Consider the sentence (1): ‘If Oswald did not assassinate Kennedy, then somebody else did.’ (1) seems true given that Kennedy was assassinated. However, consider (2): ‘If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then someone else would have.” (2) seems like (1). However, (2) does not appear to be true. It seems like we should say that (3) is true: ‘If Oswald had not assassinated Kennedy, then Kennedy would have finished his first term as President.’ This example highlights the difference between indicative conditionals like (1) and counterfactuals conditionals like (2) and (3). During this course we will explore the nature of indicative conditionals and counterfactual conditionals and their relationship to one another along with various philosophical puzzles that arise from them. <br>Conditionals are often used to provide analysis for philosophical topics like causation, modality, degrees of belief, knowledge, etc. However, conditionals, both indicative and counterfactual, have great importance in other academic disciplines such linguistics, psychology, physics, and computer science. Both types of counterfactuals also use resources from logic and probability theory. As such, we will consider both types of conditionals in an interdisciplinary setting. However, I must stress that no formal background is required for this course. You will develop these formal tools as we move through the course. The course will be divided into three parts. Part 1 is on the nature of indicative conditionals. Topics will include the semantics and pragmatics of indicative conditionals, the logic of indicative conditionals and whether the indicative conditional is the same as the material conditional that you encounter in basic logic, and the relationship between indicative conditionals and probability. Part 2 will be on counterfactual conditionals. We will spend time considering how counterfactuals differ from indicatives. Again, we will consider the semantics and pragmatics of counterfactual conditionals and the relationship of counterfactuals with probability. However, we will also consider the role counterfactuals play in understanding philosophical topics like modality, causality, and knowledge. We will also consider some counterfactual theories of knowledge (safety and sensitivity). Lastly, Part 3 will consider issues with the semantics of counterfactuals laid out in Part 2. We will consider whether the issues lead to counterfactual skepticism, the view that all counterfactuals are false, and whether we therefore cannot ‘know’ them.<br> Requirements and Grading:<br>The bulk of the grade will come from two take home exams. At the end of Part 1 and Part 2, a take home exam that consists in short answers will be distributed. Each will be worth 35% of the grade. The remaining 30% of the grade will be constituted by low stakes classwork. <br>We will use Jonathan Bennett’s classic A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals as our main text. However, we will also read articles by Angelika Kratzer, Paul Grice, David Lewis, Robert Stalnaker, Karen Lewis, Sarah Moss, Nina Emery, Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek, Timothy Williamson, among others. Session: Session II Day: M, T, Th Time: 1:50pm - 4:20pm Credit Hours: 4 Credits Course Format: 2190 Brandeis Graduation Requirement Fulfilled: HUM Enrollment Limit: Course Classification: Undergraduate Level Course Course Tuition: $3,100 Course Fees: None Open to High School Students: No |
